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COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITIAL ON
GROUJND'S OF INS'ANITYt
By M. ALBERT FIGINsKI*
I.
THE PROCEDURES OF CRIMINAL COMMITMENT GENERALLY

"Jurors, in common with people in general, are
aware of the meanings of verdicts of guilty and not
guilty. It is common knowledge that a verdict of not
guilty means that the prisoner goes free and that a
verdict of guilty means that he is subject to such
punishment as the court may impose. But a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity has no such commonly
understood meaning."'
This lack of knowledge can logically result from two
factors. One, the verdict is a rare one in our society, given
the state of extreme dementation required by the "right
and wrong test" to acquit. Second, unlike the verdicts of
guilty and not guilty which have the same meaning and
effect throughout Anglo-American jurisprudence, the
meaning and effect of a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity are dependent upon statutes and vary among the
states.
Prior to the passage of the present statutes, it is doubtful whether the court had any power to commit to a mental
institution any person found not guilty by reason of insanity.2 However, there are reported cases where such
persons were in fact committed when special facts were
present. One who had been civilly committed' to the
house of correction as a "dangerous person" after his
arraignment for murder and who was subsequently tried 4
t This article is based on a paper originally prepared for the seminar
on Medico-Legal Problems at the University of Maryland School of
Law under the supervision of Professor L. Whiting Farinholt, Jr.
* Of the Maryland Bar; AB. 1959, Johns Hopkins University; LL B.
1962, University of Maryland.
"Lyles v. United States, 254 F. 2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Opinion
of Prettyman & Burger, J.J.).
2 Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 614, 623-5 (1885).
3For a discussion of civil commitment procedures, see Chasanow,
Civil and Criminal Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Maryland, 21
Md. L. Rev. 279 (1961).
4How may one be tried when under commitment because of mental
disorder? The answer lies in the varying tests for insanity used by the
law. See Comment, Varying Tests for Insanity, 15 Md. L. Rev. 255
(1955) and Chasanow, op. cit. supra, n. 3.
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and acquitted of the criminal charge on grounds of insanity, was returned to the institution upon his acquittal.'
This is some indication that courts had limited ability to
commit one acquitted on ground of insanity. Furthermore, where one who believed himself to be the King of
England attempted to assassinate President Andrew Jackson to erase the last obstacle to his reign over the United
States, was found not guilty by reason of insanity, the
court after the verdict remanded the prisoner to the custody of the law on grounds that it "would be extremely
dangerous to permit him to be at large while under this
mental delusion." 6 That this procedure was not universally
followed can be seen by a statement of the Supreme Court
of Georgia:
"[If the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity
is] satisfactorily made out [, it] would finally acquit
the defendant of the charge preferred against him and
entitle him to go without a day [of detention] absolutely freed and discharged of the offense for which
he was indicted. * * *
Our Code makes no provision for the detention and
disposal of prisoners acquitted on ground of insanity
existing at the commission of the offense, but, . . .
they are at once discharged, and go free to commit a
like act upon the recurrence of another attack, with
like fatal results on some other unoffending citizen.
That this omission should be supplied by legislation
covering this case, we think is apparent; and at the
same time, it might be well to provide a place for the
safe keeping of such persons, and when thus confined,
to prescribe how they shall be discharged."7
Whether the Georgia Legislature responded to this
judicial plea for remedial legislation or to the more usual
sources of legislative influence, it is to be noted that
Georgia now stands with nine other states and the District of Columbia and orders the defendant, who is acquitted because of insanity at the time of the commission
5

Commonwealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168 (1810).

6 U.S. v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887, 891 (Case Nlo. 15,577) (D.C.
Cir. 1835).
7 Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 614, 623-625 (1885). Emphasis added. See
also Ballard v. State, 19 Neb. 609, 28 N.W. 271, 275 (1886), a somewhat
confusing opinion which seems to indicate that a not guilty by reason
of insanity verdict results in the discharge of the prisoner.
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of the acts charged, "to be confined" in a mental hospital,8
and only to be released in accord with other statutory provisionsY This procedure is termed mandatory or automatic commitment because it leaves no room for judicial
discretion or other means to avoid commitment of one
adjudged not guilty by reason of insanity. In a state having
an automatic commitment procedure, it has been held that
the court must commit a defendant, acquitted on ground
of insanity, to the state mental hospital even though
shortly before the criminal trial defendant was declared
restored to his right mind in probate court proceedings. 10
Other jurisdictions allow commitment in the court's
discretion. Such procedure may provide no criteria for
determination of the necessity for defendant's after-trial
hospitalization, thus giving the court wide freedom of action to be exercised in the court's sound discretion."
Other states allow commitment if defendant would be dangerous to public peace or safety if given his freedom; 12
6

Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1957 Supp.) § 39-8-4; Conn. Gen. Stat. (1958)
§ 54-37; D.C. Code Ann. (1960 VIII) § 24-301; Ga. Code Ann. (1953)
§ 27-1503; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1949) § 62-1532; Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) § 767.27; Minn. Stat. (1947) § 631.19; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1958)
§ 29-2203; Nev. Rev. Stat. (1957)
§ 175.445; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
(Baldwin 1958) § 2945.39; Wis. 'Stat. (1957) § 957.11 (3).
Mass. Ann. Laws (1957) § 123-101, provides for mandatory commitment
for life if acquitted of murder or manslaughter.
9Release procedures vary from a provision that such a patient be
discharged as any other mental patient, 10A Ga. Code § 27-1503 (1953)
to a procedure requiring judicial approval of all releases and requiring
the hospital superintendent to certify that the patient has recovered
his sanity and he will not in ithe future be dangerous to himself or
others. D.C. Code § 24-301 (e) (Supp. VIII 1960). In order to obtain
release one committed after acquittal on ground of insanity may be
required to make a stronger showing 'of restoration to sanity than the
patient who has never been charged with a crime. Petition of Golden,
341 Mass. 672, 171 N.E. 2d 473 (1961) ; Ex Parte Dubina, 311 Mich. 482,
18 N.W. 2d 902 (1945) or the test for release may be the same for both.
Salinger v. Superintendent, 206 Md. 623, 112 A. 2d 907 (1955).
oHodison v. Rogers, 137 Kan. 950, 22 P. 2d 491, 493, 88 A.L.R. 1080
(1933). The Court stressed that the governing statute required commitment after a not guilty 'by reason of insanity verdict with release only
after a finding by a designated board and that the test of sanity for
release differed from the test applied in the probate court. See also
State v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 535, 125 So. 580, 585 (1929).
"La. Rev. Stat. (1950) § 15.268; Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) § 27-119;
Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. (1954) § 19-1351-3; S.C. Code Ann. (1958 Supp.)
§ 32-927.
2Del. Code Ann. (1958 Supp.) § 114702 (a), (c); Fla. Stat. (1957)
§ 919-11; Iowa Code (1958) § 785.18; Mass. Ann. Laws (1957) §§ 277-16,
278-13; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1959 Supp.)
§ 607.3; N.Y. Code
Criminal Proc. (1959) § 454; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (1950) § 122-84;
N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§ 12-0503, 29-2236; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1957)
§ 136.730; R.I. Gen. Laws (1956) §§ 26-4-3, 26-4-4, 26-4-7; S.D. Code
(1939) § 34.2004; Vt. Stat. Ann. (1959) § 13.4805; Va. Code (1953)
§ 19-213.
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but, some allow commitment only if the mental disorder,
which rendered defendant irresponsible for his otherwise
criminal act, persists at time of verdict." The court, not
the jury, is required to make these determinations.
Some jurisdictions, notably the Federal, provide for
no commitment after the "insanity verdict" but permit
the person to leave the courtroom a free man.
Maryland and six other states do not adhere to any of
the above procedures. The jury which has exonerated the
prisoner from punishment because it found him to be
insane at the time of the commission of the act is given
the further task of determining the prisoner's present
mental condition. 4 If the jury finds him sane, he is free; if
insane, he is detained in a mental hospital. Whether the
jury, in order to determine the prisoner's sanity at the
time of the verdict, is to apply the test of criminal responsibility, commonly the right and wrong test, or some
other test, such as whether the prisoner, if given his freedom, would be dangerous to himself and others, has been
given no appellate consideration in Maryland. Some
writers would have the prisoner's dangerousness be the
guide, 5 but the criminal courts seem to favor a determination of prisoner's freedom in terms of criminal responsibility, i.e., the right and wrong test.16 Furthermore,
the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity is seen in Maryland as an admission by the defendant that he committed
the act alleged.17 The question of insanity is placed in
issue first and the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
"results ... in the automatic supposition that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged without a
[determination of] whether or not a crime was com'3Ala. Code Ann. (1940) § 15.429; Cal. Penal Code Ann. (1949)
§ 1026; Idaho Code (1947) § 19-2320; Ind. Stat. Ann. (1950) § 9-1704 (a);
Ky. Crim. Code (Baldwin, 1959) § 268; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) § 2A:163-2;
N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) § 41-13-3; Utah Code Ann. (1953) § 77-24-15;
W. Va. Code Ann. (1955) § 6198.
145 Md. Code (1957) Art. 59, § 8; Ill. Ann. Stat. (1958 Supp.)
§ 38-592;
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 2575; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) § 546.510; Okla.
Stat. Ann. (1951) § 22-1161; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. (Vernon, 1958)
Art. 932 b. 1 (b) ; Wash. Rev. Code (1958) § 10.76.090.
fChasanow, Civil and Criminal Commitment of the Mentally III in
Maryland, 21 Md. L. Rev. 279, 296-302 (1961).
1 Dr. Manfred Guttmacher, Chief Medical Officer of the Supreme Bench
of 17Baltimore City, in lecture to Legal Medical Seminar.
Casenote, The Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 15
Md. L. Rev. 157, 168 (1955).
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mitted
or if the defendant was the one who committed
it."'l5
California presents a unique procedure when the defense of insanity is raised in a criminal case. The trial
is divided into two parts, the defendant being first tried
to determine if he committed the act alleged. If the defendant is found guilty, either the same jury or a new
one tries the issue of defendant's sanity at the time of the
act proved. 19 If found not guilty by reason of insanity,
there is commitment unless the court concludes that defendant has "fully recovered his sanity." The separate
trial procedure was devised by a "prosecution-minded"
law revision commission to avoid the use of a claim of
insanity as a means "to gull juries into verdicts of acquittal."2 The trial of guilt was to proceed devoid of
sentimentality. However, since no evidence of defendant's
mental condition was admissible in the first trial, and since
some offenses requiring the proof of intent must be established by testimony on mental ability to reflect and deliberate, a problem of administration developed. The
California Supreme Court attempted to strike a delicate
balance by stating:
"[I]f the proffered evidence tends to show not merely
that [defendant] did or did not, but rather that because of legal insanity he could not, entertain the
specific intent or other essential mental state, then
that evidence is inadmissible under the not guilty plea
and is admissible only on the trial on the plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity."'"
This tenuous distinction has proved very difficult to administer.22 On this basis and because subsequent decisions
have tended to open the door in the first trial to all of the
sympathy-provoking testimony which the separate trial
procedure was designed to eliminate,23 the California pro2Hearings
on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., let Sess. 638 (1961) (remarks of Charles E.
Goshen, Director, Community Psychiatric Services, Department of Mental
Hygiene, State of Maryland).
"Cal. Penal Code § 1026 (1957).
0 Louisell 'and Hazard, Insanity as a Defense: The Bifurcated Trial,
49 Cal. L. Rev. 805, 807, 808 (1961).
-aPeople v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P. 2d 53, 66 (1949).
1People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P. 2d 705 (1954).
1 People v. Webb. 143 Cal. App. 2d 402, 300 P. 2d 130 (1956).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

cedure has been criticized as a mere duplication of time
and effort, and change to the normal single trial method
advocated.2 4
II.
RATIONALE AND PROBLEMS

Turning away from bare procedures, we seek to discover what is the rationale of the various commitment
procedures, what society seeks to accomplish by commitment, and what other legal problems, rules and procedures
bear upon the question of commitment to assist or hinder
the attainment of the goals of the commitment procedure.
It will be noted that all of the various procedures are
designed in some way to protect society from the premature release of one found not guilty by reason of insanity.
Providing for the safety of its citizens is a legitimate
concern of the state, yet the course chosen to effectuate this
purpose must be guided by the compelling, and often
competing, theme of a free society, i.e., individual liberty.
Irrational societal fears will not be allowed to impair an
individual's liberty. However, it is hardly irrational for
society to demand assurance that one, who violated society's standard of action under the compulsion of a mental
disturbance, and escaped society's wrath because of that
compelling disturbance, is no longer dangerous to society
and himself because of that compelling disturbance. But
it would be irrational for society to confine in a mental
hospital any person not considered insane for any period
longer than absolutely necessary for observation to determine mental status.
Perhaps any commitment procedure lends itself to allegations of deprivation of liberty. But the commitment
after a successful insanity defense is particularly susceptible for two reasons. First, the tendency of society to desire
to punish 5 coupled with the widespread feeling that insanity is easily feigned may cause society to impose improper restraints on the "faker" who has avoided his
"just desert." But punishment and commitment are antithetical. Punishment is a corollary of responsibility, 6
Douisell and Hazard, op. cit. 8upra, n. 20, 821-824, 830. Colorado also
maintains a separate trial procedure, but that procedure is not mandatory.
The defendant may elect a single trial. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-8-1 to
39-8-4 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
2 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956) ch. 6, esp. pp. 138-140.
HALL, 'GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1960) 460.
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whereas commitment flows from irresponsibility, among
other things, and is designed to protect and rehabilitate.
Second, the presentation of the insanity defense centers
for consideration on a different time period than relates
to the propriety of commitment and/or hospitalization.
It has been said:
"The crucial question in a trial where insanity is
pleaded as a defense is whether the accused suffered
from a mental disease at the time of the offense. Since
the defendant must be mentally competent to be
tried, it is possible - indeed it is not uncommon for a jury to conclude that the defendant is not guilty
by reason of insanity as of the time of the offense,
although he may be of sound mind at the time of the
verdict."2 7
To avoid placing this sound mind among unsound minds
must be considered when committing after the successful
insanity defense.
In short, what is desired is a balanced procedure providing safeguards to the society and the individual. We do
not wish merely to provide the insanity defense as an
accessible escape hatch for the criminal. Nor do we want
our citizens stalked by men of proven criminal propensity
and subnormal ability to restrain those antisocial urgings.
However, we do not want a man not legally blamable for
an act, punished, though that may be masked by a more
subtle excuse for confinement.
In light of the foregoing discussion of the demands of
society and the safeguards required for the protection of
the individual, what may be said for the various types of
procedures used to commit one found not guilty by reason
of insanity? Because discretionary commitment, in all of
its various forms, requires, before confinement to a mental
hospital, some type of determination that the individual
specially acquitted continues to be plagued by some form
of mental illness, it has been said to "substantially lessen
the possibility that a sane man may be sent to a mental
institution because of an act for which he was not criminally responsible. ' 2 This form of procedure certainly
protects society in a more superior fashion than the
Federal practice of allowing one not guilty by reason of
insanity to walk out of the courtroom a free man without
" 107 Oong. Rec. 10370 (daily ed. June 26, 1961).
21Comment, Criminal Law-Defense of Insanity-Mandatory Commitment Statute Under the Durham Rule, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 624, 633 (1961).
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any regard to his present state of mind. At least, the discretionary commitment places in mental hospitals those
requiring treatment.
Yet, a highly regarded figure in the area of medicolegal
problems, Professor of Law Henry Weihofen has been
critical of allowing a jury (as in Maryland) to determine
the propriety of commitment at the same time that it
acquits the defendant due to insanity. He has written:
"This is surely the poorest and most cumbersome of
all ways to handle the matter. When a person has
just convinced a jury that he committed a criminal
act under the influence of mental disorder, it is both
fair and prudent to presume that that disorder continues to exist. If he has in fact recovered, the hospital to which he is sent can be relied upon to discover and report the fact. Or he can raise the question himself on application for habeas corpus or other
procedure.
Asking the criminal trial jury to decide whether
the defendant is presently sane is illogical as well as
unfair and imprudent. * ** [I]t is unfair to the public,
for it empowers a jury to decide that a person charged
with a serious crime was insane at the time of the
act but now recovered, and so entitled to be set free.
Even a psychiatrist would hesitate to certify to recovery so soon after the insane act. A jury is quite
incompetent to make this determination on the
basis
29
of evidence introduced at the criminal trial."
This statement is essentially a brief for the mandatory
commitment procedure. It includes several arguments
usually used to justify that procedure, foremost of which
is the presumption of continued insanity from an act to
verdict.30 This presumption rests on the assumptions that
the trial occurs "soon"V after the act and that freedom may
be validly restricted if there exist remedial procedures,
such as habeas corpus, to correct improper restraints.
The interval between the commission of the act and
the rendition of the jury's verdict of insanity at the time
2Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by Reason of
Insanity, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 849, 849-50 (1960). Emphasis added.
8 Supra, n. 28, 630; Note, Criminal Law: Commitment 4 Release of
Criminal Defendants Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 1961 Duke L.J. 481,
483 (1961).
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of the act may not, however, be short.1 Arrest of the defendant may not follow directly on the heels of the act.
Perhaps a more likely and compassionate reason for a
delay is treatment in a mental hospital after arraignment
in order to render the defendant competent to stand trial,
i.e., able to assist his counsel in the preparation of his defense.3

2

Reported cases evidence as much as two and three-

quarter years treatment prior to trial.3 3 Logically, the
longer the delay between act and verdict, the weaker the
presumption of continued insanity becomes.
The availability of habeas corpus proceedings to challenge illegal detention can hardly stand alone to justify
the mandatory commitment.3 4 It is true that courts have

seized upon the availability of release procedures to justify
the automatic dispension of the defendant to a mental hos-

pital. Statements to this effect are usually collateral to
a finding or assumption by the court that the presumption
of continued insanity has merit.3 The presumption provides the rational basis for the original confinement. The
continuing validity of the detention is provided by the
availability of procedures to test the legality of the continued confinement.
The presumption of continued insanity and the availability of habeas corpus to test the validity of the detention are not the only buttresses of the mandatory
commitment procedure. Another justification is that by
"voluntarily raising the defense of insanity," the defendant
acknowledges and voluntarily submits to confinement for
psychiatric observation after acquittal.3" The plea is
81Supra, n. 27; Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally
Ill Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (remarks of Senator
Hruska, R. Neb.).
I See 5 Md. Code Art. 59, § 7. Cf., The restriction placed on the privilege
of a mental examination prior to trial in the District of Columbia as a
reaction to the Durham rule. D.C. Code Ann. § 24-301 (a) (Supp. VIII,
1960) ; S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 11, n. 28 (1955).
Fielding v. United States, 251 F. 2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"Cf., Note, Criminal Law: Commitment d Release of Criminal Defendants Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 1961 Duke L.J. 481, 483 (1961).
"See two 'of most-cited cases for the proposition that availability of
habeas corpus satisfies due process: People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 8
N.W. 2d 99 (1943) where there was no delay to reduce the weight of
the presumption; Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 Pac. 769, 771
(1930) : "The insanity of [one acquitted by reason of insanity] is presumed
to continue until the contrary is shown, and that it is not necessary to
hold the inquisition generally required by statute in the case of persns
alleged to be insane before their commitment."
Comment, A Logical Analysis of Criminal Responsibility and Mandatory Commitment, 70 Yale L.J. 1354, 1355 (1961); Comment, Criminal
Law-Defense of Insanity-Mandatory Commitment Statute under the
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analogized to the application for voluntary civil commitment. This presupposes a recognition by the pleader of
the defect or illness, plus a desire for assistance. This
contention, of course, applies only where defendant asserts
the plea himself; otherwise, there is no similarity to an
application by a party for voluntary civil commitment.' 7
In addition, because the defendant has breached a societal standard, it is felt that before release a psychiatrist
should have a chance to work with him in a clinical
environment to give society some assurance that the defendant will not repeat his actions. 8
Perhaps the most mundane justification for the automatic commitment procedure is the desire to add to "the
public's peace of mind" 39 and dispel the popular fear that
any alteration of the test for criminal responsibility to
bring the right and wrong standard in line with modern
psychiatric knowledge will lead to the visitation of a
plague of insane criminals on society. 40 Whether the fear
indicates an "inability of public opinion ... to keep pace
with the advances in the behavioral sciences,''41 or has a
more subtle basis, it undoubtedly motivates legislators.4 2
Thus, the automatic commitment procedure is made the
bedfellow of any reform of the test of criminal responsibility. These two forces acting together give psychiatry a
more prominant place in the criminal law than at any previous time by exonerating from punishment the mentally
irresponsible actor and placing him in the hands of the
hospital for custody 43 and rehabilitation. It would then
appear to follow that psychiatrists would welcome the
bedfellow of reform. However, doubts have been voiced
as to the efficacy of the mandatory commitment procedure
by psychiatrists. Dr. Leon Salzman, Associate Professor
of Clinical Psychiatry, Georgetown Medical School, has
vehemently attacked the mandatory commitment procedure.
"Under the automatic commitment procedure, an
individual who is acquitted by reason of insanity is
Durham Rule, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 624, 629 (1961). Cf., O'Beirne v. Overholser,
193 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.D.C. 1961).
tm
I bid.
88Supra, n. 28, 630.
S. Rep. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955).
40 Supra, n. 28, 632; Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and
Committed Because of Insanity: The Need for Balanced Administration,
68 Yale L.J. 293, 297 (1958).
4Supra,
n. 28, 632.
"' Supra, n. 39.
,0Salinger v. Superintendent, 206 Md. 623, 628, 112 A. 2d 907 (1955).
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automatically sent to a mental hospital for study and
treatment. Since he has stood trial, it is assumed
that he was competent to do so. Yet, at the time of
the sentencing, there has been no evidence presented
to show that he is necessarily of unsound mind or that
he requires treatment at the time.
"It has merely been established that, at the time
the crime took place, the defendant was of unsound
mind. Consequently, he is being sent for treatment at
a time when it is not clear to defendant or the court
that he is in need of such treatment.
"On what basis is treatment to take place? The
presumption is that prisoner must be under the sway
and influence of the distorted mental state which produced the crime. But he is told that he is competent
to stand trial and also that he is mentally ill and requires treatment.
"Such contradictory claims, notwithstanding the
complicated differences between competency to stand
trial and still being of unsound mind, are not impressive to the defendant, particularly since he may have
a low intelligence quotient. Thus, whatever treatment
might have been possible, even when necessary, is
jeopardized by the apparent contradictory claims of
the court.
"The prisoner can only view the decision to send
him to the mental hospital as a sentence in a hospital
in lieu of a prison. He sees the action as a means of
substitute punishment and not the benevolent action
of a concerned community. Thus, the basis for treatment which may be desirable or necessary is complicated by the issue of punishment and forced hospitalization.
"Psychiatric therapy cannot even
start, let alone
' 44
develop, under such circumstances.
III.
THE PILOT PROJECT-THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

To this point we have been concerned primarily with
the statement of the various types of commitment procedures and with a discussion of the theoretical justification
"Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill before
the Subcommittee on Oonstitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 625-626 (1961). Emphasis added.
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for and difficulties with discretionary and mandatory commitment. However, the problems raised by mandatory
commitment arise not solely from the procedure itself.
Other legal rules, problems and procedures, such as the
burden of proving insanity at the criminal trial, the test
of criminal responsibility, the right to assert the insanity
defense and the procedure of release of those committed,
are not isolated from the commitment procedure but
rather work with it upon the subject of the criminal case.4"
To see how these collateral standards have operated to
hinder or assist the protection of society and the individual
and to see how the commitment procedure has worked in
practice, we focus on the District of Columbia, the only
jurisdiction which has had extensive case law relating to
the meaning of, and procedures under, the commitment
statute.
The situation created by the interrelation of (1) the
Durham rule4 6 which relieves more defendants of criminal
responsibility than does the right and wrong test,4 7 (2)
the mandatory commitment procedure following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, 8 (3) the release
'0 Id., 550 (remarks of 'Senator Keating) :
"[The problem of commitment procedures for defendants acquitted
'by reason of insanity] cannot be wholly isolated . . . from consideration of the tests of criminal responsibility. The adequacy of any
commitment procedures necessarily depends to some extent on the
kind and number of individuals subject to commitment. * * * The
test of responsibility, the burden of proof, the attitude of the courts
toward expert and lay testimony - all of these factors and others
determine whether the commitment problem is designed to cope with
a few persons or with hundreds of persons, whether it is to function
as a substantial counterpart to jail commitment or as a rare procedure
for exceptional cases."
40"[Ain accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was
the product of mental disease or mental defect." Durham v. United
States, 214 F. 2d 862, 874-875 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
47 107 Cong. Rec. 10369 (daily ed. June 26, 1961) :
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Fiscal
Number acquitted
Year
due to insanity
1952 ......................................
3
1953 ......................................
3
1954 ......................................
7

4

[Durham decided July 1, 1954]
1955 ...................................... 10
1956 ......................................
15
1957 ......................................
7
1958 ...................................... 14
1959 ...................................... 30
1960 ......................................
30
Although the 1960 figure is ten 'times the 1952 figure, in 1960 only
2.1% of all criminal defendants were acquitted due to insanity.
D.C. Code (Supp. VIII, 1960) § 24-301 (d).

1962]

COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL

305

procedure after commitment,4 9 (4) the burden on the
prosecution of proving beyond a reasonable doubt defendant's sanity after some evidence of insanity has been
introduced into the case,50 (5) the administrative decision
to place "sociopaths"'" within the category of those having
a mental disease or defect, (6) the ability of the prosecution to initiate evidence of insanity,5 2 and (7) the trial
court's refusal to accept a guilty plea from one competent53
to stand trial where there is evidence of mental illness
has led to a challenge of the constitutionality of the
total procedure,54 Senatorial inquiry 5 and House of Representative action.5 6 None of these effects has affected the
situation as yet.
In announcing the Durham rule, i.e., that an accused
is not criminally responsible if this unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or mental defect, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the District of Columbia Code gave the trial judge discretion to
commit the accused found not guilty by reason of insanity,
and said:
"We think that even where there has been a specific
finding that the accused was competent to stand trial
and to assist in his own defense, the court would be
well advised to invoke this Code provision so that the
accused may be confined as long' 7as 'the public safety
and * * * [his] welfare' require."
In spite of this appellate counsel and even though "no case
could be found in which the acquitted defendant had not
"D.C. Code (Supp. VIII, 1960) § 24-301 (e).
5 Tatum v. United States, 190 F. 2d 612, 615-616 (D.C. Cir. 1951) ; Davis
v. United States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S.
469 (1895).

RInfra, n. 76.
U Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 569 (1961) (remarks of Oliver Gasch,
former U.S. Attorney for the District 'of Columbia).
5 See Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F. 2d 388, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
"Ibid.; see also Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961);
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F. 2d 943, 948 if (D.C. Cir. 1960).
U Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
1 H.R. 7052, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), discussed and passed by the
House of Representatives acting as a Committee of the Whole (107 Cong.
Rec. 10366-10377 (daily ed. June 26, 1961)) and sent to the 'Senate (107
Cong. Rec. 19535 (daily ed. June 27, 1961) ).
1' Durham v. United
States, 214 F. 2d 862, 876, fn. 57 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Emphasis added.
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been committed,""8 Congress, to allay public fears that insane criminals would be set free,59 enacted the mandatory
commitment procedure. 0
In order to enhance societal protection, the commitment was for an indefinite time and release was allowed
only when the superintendent of the mental hospital to
which the person was committed certified (1) that the
person has recovered his sanity, and (2) that he will not
"in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or
others."'" It has been held that release may be precluded if
there is competent evidence that the person may commit
any criminal act, not merely a violent crime.2 The court
was given the authority to hold a hearing, on its own
motion or upon objection to release by the prosecution, to
hear evidence to determine the propriety of the superintendent's decision.
The person committed has the
prerogative of instituting habeas corpus proceedings and
winning release if he can show, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that he is no longer suffering from mental illness, that
he will not be dangerous to himself and others in the
reasonable future and that the superintendent acted
arbitrarily in refusing to recommend release. 4 This is a
heavy burden to sustain, especially in view of the fact
that the typical person faced with it is indigent or of
modest means and thus unable to secure independent
psychiatric examination and testimony. The dire need for
beds in the psychiatric wards and the good faith of the
medical authorities have been advanced as an argument
that release will not be delayed longer than absolutely
necessary. 5 As a counterweight, there is a conservative
attitude in regard to release desiring to retain the patient
perhaps longer than necessary to establish the patient's
recovery and thus save face for the program by establishing a low percentage of recidivism, perhaps at the
cost of an overly long confinement.
If the District of Columbia procedure only included
the above-mentioned Durham rule, mandatory commitment
procedure and release provisions, it is doubtful whether
5 Note, Criminal Law: Commitment and Release of Criminal Defendants
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 1961 Duke L.J. 481, fn. 4 (1961).
Supra, n. 39.
Supra, n. 48.
Supra, n. 49.
'Overholser
v. Russell, 283 F. 2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Supra, n. 49.
Overholser v. Russell, 283 F. 2d 195, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Ragsdale
v. Overholser, 281 F. 2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Supra, n. 52, 573.
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the storm of indignation which surrounds the District of
Columbia procedure would have materialized. The abovementioned indefinite confinement can be justified to the
satisfaction of most observers on the basis of protecting
society if the accused raises the insanity defense himself
and if he is actually found to have been insane at some
point. But this is not necessarily the case in the District.
Long before the Durham rule was propounded, the District of Columbia courts followed the Federal and perhaps
the majority 66 rule in regard to the burden of proof in
insanity cases.
If "some evidence," which need not
amount to evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt,
is introduced in the case, it devolves upon the prosecution
to establish defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 6s
Because of the Durham rule the prosecution must show
that the accused did not suffer from mental disease or
defect at the time of the act, or that if he was mentally ill,
it did not cause him to perpetrate the act.69 "In effect, to
obtain a conviction the Government
' 70 must carry the burden
of proving a negative proposition.
Because of this rule as to the burden of proof, it has
been argued that the District of Columbia jury never
affirmatively finds the defendant to have been insane but
rather merely returns a verdict of not guilty by reason
of insanity, thus causing mandatory commitment, when
the panel has "doubt" about his mental condition at the
time of the act.7 1 The rationale of a presumption of continued insanity to justify commitment is thus impaired because there has never been a finding of insanity.72 When
this argument is coupled with the District of Columbia rule
that insanity is not merely an affirmative defense which
may only be introduced into the case by the defendant s
and with the refusal to allow a defendant to change his
plea to guilty so as to avoid indefinite confinement in a
mental hospital and take a short prison sentence instead, a
01Casenote, Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L.
Rev. 157, 167-8 (1955).
87Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895).
1 Tatum v. United States, 190 F. 2d 612, 615-616 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal
Lorelei, 49 Geo. L.J. 294, 297 (1960).
70Ibid.

U.See Fahy, concurring, Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F. 2d 943, 950
(D.C.
Cir. 1960) ; Halleck, op. cit. supra, n. 69, 305.
72
Ibid. See also supra, n. 55, 107 (remarks of Halleck), 552 (remarks of
Lawrence Speiser, Washington Director, American Civil Liberities Union).
ISee Overholser v. Lynch, 288 F. 2d 388, 393-394 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
Supra, n. 55, 569 (remarks of Oliver Gasch, former U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia).
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conclusion is reached that the procedure leads to unjust
results.7 4
Superimposed on this legal maze is the "administrative
policy" of Saint Elizabeths Hospital.7 5 That policy includes
sociopathy as a mental disease within the meaning of the
Durham rule and the release provisions. Sociopathy designates an abnormal mental attitude toward one's environment which does not hamper the person's contact with
reality, but which impairs, to varying extents, his ability
to perceive his social and moral responsibilities and obligations. Furthermore, it is more or less a permanent way
of life not susceptible to alteration through treatment.7 6
One product of the personality may be habitual criminality. There is conflict of opinion in medical circles as to
whether this is a mental illness,7 7 but when accepted as
such, it clearly broadens the ability to acquit and retain in
custodial confinement in the District of Columbia. 7 However, it is not such a state of mind which would subject a
person to civil commitment.7 9
Much of the current legal dissatisfaction with the District of Columbia situation is mirrored in O'Beirne v.
Overholser,0 a case involving a petition for habeas corpus
to compel release of one who was restrained in St. Elizabeths Hospital because he was classified as a "sociopath."
District Judge Holtzoff granted the petition, and ordered
release of one who had spent four years in the hospital
after acquittal of a petty larceny charge for which the
maximum prison sentence is one year. The Court noted
that, while the superintendent's denial of release is not
final and conclusive for all legal purposes, it could only
reverse the administrative action if the action is "arbitrary and capricious."' 81 However, because the petitioner
had been committed to the hospital one month before the
administrators decided to diagnose a sociopathic personality as a mental disease, and because this decision was a
change in policy which had the effect of precluding a re74

1Supra, n.72.
1 Saint Elizabeths Is the mental institution to which those found n'ot
guilty by reason of insanity are automatically sent.
See "sociopathy" and "psychopathic personality" as defined in Hinsie &
Shatsky, Psychiatric Dictionary (2d ed. 1953), and in Webster's Third
International Dictionary.
"Supra, n. 55, 649 (remarks of the Hon. Alexander Holtzoff, Judge,
U.S. District Court for the District of Oolumbla).
78O'Beirne v. Overholser, 193 F. Supp. 652, 659-661 (D.D.C. 1961).
Supra, ns. 77 and 78.
193 F. Supp. 652 (D.D.C. 1961).
Id., 660.
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lease which would have been possible prior to the change,
the Court concluded:
"That personal liberty should depend on such an arbitrary circumstance is manifestly intolerable and contrary to the basic principles of freedom." 2
The Court distinguished denials of petitions brought by
those acquitted as sociopaths who objected to their detention as sociopaths. Presenting a sort of estoppel argument, the Court wrote:
"[These men in the case where habeas corpus was
denied] received the benefit of this tour de force and
[were] acquitted on the ground of insanity - something that would not have happened if [they] had
been tried a few days earlier. [They were] not in a
position to complain when [they] found [themselves]
in a mental institution as a result of receiving what
seemed 8to
[them] at the time the benefit of the new
' 3
outlook.
Because of this distinction, the case has limited use as
precedent, serving to aid release of not all sociopaths, but
only those committed prior to the change in administrative
policy.
However, the Court's dicta serves to indict the present
District of Columbia procedure.
"It seems astounding that a person who is not subject
to civil commitment to a mental institution can be
confined in a locked criminal ward of a mental institution . . . . In this case the petitioner has been
incarcerated in a criminal ward of a mental hospital
for over three years because he committed a crime
for which he could be punished by imprisonment for
not more than one year, and this has occurred under
circumstances under which he could not be committed
as a civil patient because he is not insane. * * * The
fact, however, that a person is an habitual petty
criminal should not subject him to permanent incarceration in a criminal ward of a mental institution.
Such a disposition may not be used as a substitute for
laws that deal expressly with habitual criminals. It is
inhumane
to confine sane human beings in a lunatic
8 4
asylum."
n. 80, 659.
80, 661. Emphasis added.
Supra, n. 80, 659. Emphasis added.

2Supra,

881
4Supra, n.
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Reflecting upon the Durham rule, Judge Holtzoff questioned whether it would have been adopted if it had been
thought that sociopaths would be relieved from criminal
liability.8 5 Finally, attorneys were admonished to reserve
the defense of insanity for capital cases and those in which
the defendant runs the risk of imprisonment for a long
term, and leave it out of the case which threatens
the de86
fendant with at most a short prison term.
Judge Holtzoff continued as the scourge of the sociopathy classification in Tremblay v. Overholser.8 7 There, a
"lady of refinement" was arrested on a charge of intoxication. Her assigned counsel requested a mental examination. Pursuant thereto, she was committed for an examination to a mental hospital, and was subsequently certified
competent to stand trial. At the trial she tried to plead
guilty, but the plea was denied by the Municipal Court,
which found, on the basis of a medical report, the defendant
not guilty by reason of insanity, even though the defendant did not raise the question of insanity and offered
no evidence of it. The mandatory commitment statute
dispatched the defendant to Saint Elizabeths. Eleven
months later she petitioned for habeas corpus to gain release from the hospital.
Judge Holtzoff, in Tremblay, was unable to rely on his
rationale of O'Beirne since the petitioner had been acquitted as a person with "sociopathic personality disturbance, alcoholism addiction." To the Judge this meant
"she is an alcoholic who lacks sufficient will power to
refrain from indulging in alcoholic beverages to excess."
The Court then threw out the commitment as improper in
the first instance because the verdict of insanity was the
result of a deprivation of a constitutional right, i.e., that
a person competent to stand trial may plead as he thinks
best.
"[I] t is a deprivation of a constitutional right to force
any defense on a defendant in a criminal case or to
compel any defendant in a criminal case to present
a particular defense which he does not desire to advance. This principle of law is accentuated when the
successful advancement of the particular defense must
end in disaster, because a person who successfully
pleads insanity must be committed to a mental institution. * * * Here, the defendant did not want and
Supra, n. 80, 660.
Supra, n. 80, 660.
87Tremblay v. Overholser, 199 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1961).
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took no step to . . . advance a plea of insanity. The
Court is of the opinion that this constitutes a violation
of due process of law.
"It may be that petitioner needs hospitalization.
Obviously, she should not be among insane people.
There was a time when insane people were placed in
jails, temporarily, at least. We looked upon this as
a barbaric custom that has been pretty well eliminated.
But we have reverted to it in reverse, we are placing
sane people in insane institutions, which I think is
88
even more barbaric."
The Tremblay case personifies all that is wrong with
the District procedure. A sociopath charged with an essentially harmless misdemeanor, usually punished by fine, was
forced into a mental hospital by a not guilty by reason
of insanity verdict which she did not seek but which was
thrust upon her. The mandatory commitment procedure
was not intended to rid society of its alcoholics but protect it from dangerous individuals who were prone to
break society's laws without mental restraint.
Such a case as Tremblay may not be brought within the
rationale of Ragsdale v. Overholser,9 which speaks forcefully in favor of mandatory commitment. There, a defendant was acquitted of a robbery charge due to insanity.
After automatic commitment, he brought habeas corpus
for release. Denying the petition, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia discussed the reasons for mandatory commitment. The procedure is said to have no penal
purpose but rather seeks to protect "the public and the
subject" and to "rehabilitate and restore" the subject not
punishable for lack of accountability. In order to serve
these purposes, commitment is not restricted to the term
of the maximum sentence one could have received if accountable, but extends until the purposes of statute are
satisfied. 0 Finding a rational connection between the
known evidence of the accused's mental disease and the
statute's mandatory commitment provision, the Court said:
"Inherent in a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity are two important elements, (a) that the
defendant did in fact commit the criminal act charged,
(b) that there exists some rational basis for belief that
9Id., 570-571. Emphasis added.
281 F. 2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Id., 947.
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the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect
of which the criminal act is a product. Congress did
not see fit to provide for a hearing following immediately upon the verdict to determine the defendant's
then mental condition. Perhaps Congress took into
account the inescapable fact that such a hearing would
be meaningless until trained medical experts had a
reasonable opportunity to observe and examine the
subject and report their findings. Hence, some time
gap between the verdict and appraisal of defendant's
then existing mental condition is unavoidable under
any scheme which would provide adequate safeguards.
* * * [S]ince the persons confined ... may judicially
test the legality of the confinement by habeas corpus,
we cannot say the means selected by Congress violated
appellant's constitutional rights.
"In these circumstances the public interests sought
to be protected outweigh appellant's claimed right to
be set free the instant the verdict is returned. It is
hardly asking too much to require that a defendant
who is absolved from punishment by society because
of his mental condition at the time of the criminal act
should accept some restraint on his liberty by confinement in a hospital for such a period as is required
to determine whether he has recovered and whether
he will be dangerous if released."'"
But in a case such as Tremblay there was a medical examination prior to trial. Thus, it would seem that a "time
gap between verdict and appraisal of defendant's then
existing mental condition" is NOT unavoidable. And is it
"hardly asking too much" to force upon someone a defense
they ignore after weighing the alternative of a fine or
indefinite incarceration in a mental hospital?
Concurring, in Ragsdale, Circuit Judge Fahy had doubts
about the constitutionality of the mandatory commitment
procedure, saying commitment could be saved only because
of continuing danger to society, not through the availabilty of habeas corpus, and suggesting that only acquittal of violent crimes
due to insanity should cause manda92
tory commitment.
11Supra, n. 89, 948-949.
12Supra, n. 89, 950-951:
"It is by no means clear that society can continue to deprive a person
of liberty by attributing to a jury's doubt about his mental condition,
which led to his acquittal and mandatory commitment, any and all
evil or criminal propensities he may be thught to have, and to keep
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While Tremblay exposes most of the faults in the
District system, and Ragsdale offered a doctrinal apology
for it, the District case which will cause greatest change
in the procedure is Lynch v. Overholser This case was
the vehicle whereby the constitutional attacks on the procedure were presented to the Supreme Court, which deftly
avoided the constitutional issue and, by relying on "legislative intent," read compulsory commitment out of the
District procedure in cases where the defendant did not
raise the insanity defense.
As in Tremblay, a non-violent act, here a violation of
the bad check law, brought the defendant, a former Army
officer, without a prior criminal record, into court. A
mental examination was ordered by the court, due to
observation of the defendant during arraignment. Again
like Tremblay, the medical report showed evidence of
sociopathy, and the court refused to allow the defendant to
plead guilty. At the trial, the defendant entered no evidence of insanity, but the report was sufficient to find
him not guilty by reason of insanity and subject him to
mandatory commitment. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia (6-3) upheld the commitment. The
Court found the denial of a guilty plea within the discretion of the trial judge and said:
"[The decision to change the plea to guilty] was one
which appellee and his counsel did not have an absolute right to make. * * * Society has a stake in seeing
to it that a defendant who needs hospital care does
not go to prison. * * * Once it is established that the
defendant did in fact commit the act charged but he
was insane at the time, then the problem is one of
rehabilitation. * * * [Even though a prison sentence
lasts for a set time while hospitalization is for an indeterminate period, the difference] is not fatal because of the overriding interest of the community in
protecting itself and its interest in rehabilitating the
him in confinement because of them. This would transform the hospital
into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense....
"The availability of habeas corpus in the abstract does not save
the statute. . . . The statute is saved by construing the conditions
governing continued confinement consistently with due process. To
do this the continued danger to society which warrants deprivation
of liberty . . . alone must be, at least, a danger comparable to the
seriousness of the offense of which the committed person was acquitted. And if that offense is of a non-violent character a more
lenient approach to the question of danger is in order, particularly
in connection with conditional release....
"369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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defendant himself. Certainly a man is not free if he
has a sickness which results in his continual criminal
activity, which, in turn, leads to a life-time in jail,
with only short breaks between sentences. In the case
before us, had [the accused] not been treated, he might
have been in and out of jail for the rest of his life on
bad check charges. Now that he has received treatrelease,
ment he is well on his way to unconditional
'
without the probability of repeat offenses. 94
Judges Fahy, Bazelon and Edgerton, dissented, saying
that Congress sought only to prevent, by mandatory commitment, the immediate return to society of a person accused of "dangerous" conduct who was acquitted by reason
of insanity. Furthermore,
"Our jurisprudence knows no such thing in times of
peace as 'preventive' or 'protective' custody of persons not guilty of crime and not found to be of
unsound mind." 95
Although the courts below had read the statute as written, the Supreme Court, reasoning from and relying on the
legislative history surrounding the enactment of the
mandatory commitment procedure, drew a distinction between the defendant who pleads insanity and one who tries
to avoid that defense. The Court, per Justice Harlan,
wrote:
"[W]e read [the mandatory commitment procedure
statute] as applicable only to a defendant acquitted on
the ground of insanity who has affirmatively relied
upon a defense of insanity, and not to one, like the
petitioner who has maintained that he was mentally
responsible when the alleged offense was committed."9' 6
The Court noted that the safeguards that Congress had
erected in the civil commitment procedure of the District
of Columbia; that the trier of fact in the District must
reach a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity even if
the evidence as to mental responsibility at the time of the
offense raises no more than a reasonable doubt of sanity
and that bare reasonable doubt as to past sanity would
not be enough to civilly commit; and, finally, that, de288 F. 2d 388, 393-394 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Emphasis added.
Id., 397.
"Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 (1962).

1962]

COMMITMENT AFTER ACQUITTAL

315

fined by House and Senate Reports, Congress seemed to
intend to insure treatment only for those who plead insanity to avoid criminal punishment and who needed
treatment and who would be dangerous if not confined.
For these reasons, the criminal defendant who disclaimed
reliance on the insanity defense is not to be subject to
mandatory commitment.
The lone dissenter to this view was Mr. Justice Clark
who accused the Court of dealing in unwarranted judicial
legislation.
"I believe . . that the Congress in adopting [the
compulsory commitment procedure] said what it
meant and that it meant what it said. I regret that
the Court has seen fit to repeal the 'plain terms' of this
statute
and write its own policy into the District's
97
law.,

The dissent goes on to discuss the constitutional issues
avoided by the Court, and argues that the District procedure is constitutional.
"Congress may reasonably prefer the safety of compulsory hospitalization subject to the release procedures offered by the statute and through habeas
corpus. * * * The problem which faced Congress was
the reconciliation of the opportunity for release of
the accused through a judicial hearing with the vital
public interest, deference to the views of institutional
authorities and a decent regard for the hospitalization
and cure of the accused. The balance struck by Congress in my view meets the essential requirements of

due process. "9T a

As a result of the Lynch decision the defendant who
refuses to assert the insanity defense will not be subject
to automatic commitment if he is acquitted, through evidence offered by the prosecution, on grounds of insanity at
the time of the act. Such defendant will pose a choice to
the authorities: either they accept his guilty plea with
the concomitant fixed sentence (in the Lynch and Tremblay type situations such sentences would indeed have
been light), but with also the possibility of transfer to
722. Also note these words of Justice Clark:
"I cannot believe Congress thought only people who claim to be
crazy are dangerous enough to be confined without further findings."
(733).
o Id., 733-34.

1Id.,
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psychiatric care after incarceration for the term of the
sentence, or, as in the past, they can introduce the evidence
of insanity at the time of the act, which going unrebutted
will acquit, and then institute civil commitment proceedings, with the concomitant hearing on the issue of present
sanity or invoke another section of the criminal commitment procedure which permits the trial judge to commit
C'prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the
expiration of any period of probation'" if he has reason to
believe that the accused "'is of unsound mind or is
mentally incompetent so as to be unable to understand
the proceeding against him.' ",97b The procedure that the
Court has engrafted on the District procedure when the
insanity issue is raised from some source other than the
defendant apparently will require some sort of determination of present mental incompetence before commitment.
The Army officer's demand for release was presented
orally to the Supreme Court by Richard Arens who was
also one of the dozen or more lawyers, psychiatrists and
jurists intimately connected with the District procedure to
give testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary in
the Spring of 1961. Mr. Arens represented the American
Civil Liberties Union and made a direct attack on the
validity of mandatory commitment and suggested remedial
legislation in the form of (1) preventing the "forcing" of
an insanity plea on the defendant, (2) requiring a hearing
to determine present dangerousness after acquittal, and (3)
providing independent psychiatric examination for the
defendant." On the other hand, Dr. Winfred Overholser,
superintendent of St. Elizabeths, defended the system as
"a practical one which has worked well" 9 and suggested
three considerations in favor of mandatory commitment:
"One, the offender .... If he needs treatment, he can
get it. Item two - we want to reassure the public
that these people are not being turned loose when
they are potentially a menace to the public. And third
. . . to serve notice that there is something that is
17bD.C. Code (Supp. VIII, 1960) § 24-301 (a) as quoted in Lynch v.
Overholser, supra, n. 96, 718.
"Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally fll before the
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 209, 215-216 (1961) (remarks of Richard
Arens, counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). See also id., 676, 683
(remarks of Dr. Samuel Polsky, Professor of Law and Legal Medicine,
Temple University Schools of Law and Medicine).
'id., 589 (remarks ,of Dr. Winfred Overholser, M.D., Superintendent,
Saint Elizabeths Hospital, D.C.).
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going to happen to [a] person . . .if he is acquitted
by reason of insanity. I think that in itself tends to
discourage the specious plea." 10
Most other witnesses fell between these points of extreme dissatisfaction with and complete approval of the
present system.
Several witnesses were dubious about the worth of the
District procedure as constituted, but did not feel repeal
of the mandatory commitment procedure was the solution, and instead favored alteration of the mandatory
procedure by establishing a time limit on the post-acquittal
confinement, and allowing or requiring thereafter a hearing to determine the person's present mental status.01 '
One form of alteration would commit a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity for 90 days to allow for examination and observation; at the end of the 90 days, the
person could be held only if civilly committed.0 2 A somewhat similar plan would provide, after verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity, for "prompt examination and prompt
hearing" to determine whether the person acquitted was
dangerous with the burden of proving that on the Government at the mental health hearing. The hearing date
would be set by the judge authorizing the examination,
thus leaving the length, but not the fact, of committal in
the discretion of the trial judge.'013 Another plan would
leave the length of observation to the psychiatrist with a
requirement that there be judicial review of mental status
within six months after the trial.0 4 It was also stated,
not by a person unsympathetic to the difficulties faced in
diagnosing mental patients, but rather by a psychiatrist,
that one day would be sufficient for the examination prior
to the mental health hearing.
"[Ilt is necessary and very feasible to have an immediate examination, and even 30 days is unnecessarily
long.
It could be done in 1 day. * * * [An hour is
enough time to make an estimate in 90 percent of the
cases....
Id., 600.

101Supra, n. 98, 111, 121, 573-4, 716.
102Supra, n. 98, 111 and 121 (remarks of Charles W. Halleck, attorney

aitlaw, Washington, D.C.).
113 Supra, n. 98, 716-717 (remarks of Kenneth A. Pye, Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center).
1"Supra, n. 98, 616, 618 (remarks of Abe Krash, an attorney who
worked in the Durham case).
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[The trouble with a long commitment is that] once
a person has been put into [a mental hospital] for
90 days the whole picture is very likely to change.
He is not likely to be the same person any more. * * *
Nobody behaves the same way there so we see a
different picture, either better or worse. * * *"105
The plans calling for mental health hearings grew out
of a belief that in the District of Columbia, because of the
burden of proof rule,10 6 an acquittal on grounds of insanity does not represent a finding that the defendant was
presently or ever insane. 10 7 Indeed, where insanity is an
affirmative defense, it was said, by a critic of the District
procedure, mandatory commitment was not without
merit. 0 8
Many of the witnesses pointed out the lack of treatment, due to lack of psychiatrists, received by anyone
committed after an acquittal. 1 9 But the societal utility
of the procedure was pointed out by an attorney who
helped establish the Durham rule:
"[T]his automatic hospitalization provision [is] wise
legislation. Few things connected with criminal justice produce a greater sense of public skepticism and
anxiety than the spectacle of an individual acquitted
of a serious offense by reason of insanity walking out
of the courtroom a free man. As Dr. Guttmacher...
has so aptly put it: 'This seems socially impolitic and
psychiatrically unsound. It completely discredits the
pleas of insanity in the minds of the public.',1o
Perhaps these words influenced another witness, a
psychiatrist, to advocate elimination of "mental illness"
as a defense to crime and hold all persons "legally accountable for their actions.""' In such a procedure, the
0 Supra, n. 98, 645 (remarks of Dr. Charles E. Goshen, Director,
Community Psychiatric Services, Department of Mental Hygiene, 'State of
Maryland).
100District Judge Holtzoff: "* * * I think most of our troubles would be
at an end if We adopted a doncrete definition 1f insanity and if we shifted
the burden of proof [to the defendant]." Supra, n. 52, 651.
101Supra, n. 98, 107, 113, 215, 554-555, 573, 605-606, 676.
10 Supra, n. 98, 109 (remarks of Halleck).
m®Supra, n. 98, 1, 12, 117, 123-124, 639, 681, 718.
110
Supra, n. 98, 604 (remarks of Krash).
m Supra, n. 98, 259-260 (remarks of Dr. Thomas S. Szasz, Professor of
Psychiatry, Upstate Medical Center, Syracuse, N.Y.). Cf. CAnOzo, WHAT
MEDICINE CAN Do Pop LAW
AND ADDRESSES (1931) 108.
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court, before imposing sentence, would investigate the
convict's past and impose either punishment or treatment,
which ever gives best potential for rehabilitating the
individual convicted. But accountability and responsibility
for the acts would attach to the actor.
Throughout the Hearings, of course, the Senators interjected their thoughts. Two such comments are particularly
revealing both of the nature of the problems thought to
be involved and of the attitudes of the speakers to those
problems.
Senator Roman Hruska (R. Neb.) expressed the concern
of defense attorney for a client, who had been insane at
the time of the act but who had recovered at the time of
the verdict, where there operates a mandatory commitment
procedure.
"What would you say . . . about a case in which
a crime is committed, and the trial doesn't take place
until 8 or 14 months later?
Such things have happened. * * *
And the defense is insanity at the time of the
commission of the crime. Obviously with the passage
of time it [the insanity] sometimes disappears ....
It disappears, and he is held, [even though he may be]
a perfectly normal person.
Now he is kind of caught in a bind, isn't he?
112
Under the present state of affairs, that is."

Perhaps the Senator overlooked the availability of
habeas corpus to relieve such a case. But this facet was
not missed, but rather dismissed, by Subcommittee Chairman Sam Ervin (D. No. Car.).
"I have just some misgivings about an automatic
commitment, because while the District of Columbia
Code . . . provides for the writ of habeas corpus, I
doubt whether a writ of habeas corpus.., is sufficient
to supplant a procedure which should be designed to
see whether the detention should originally be initiated.
Of course, the mandatory commitment is based
upon the theory that.., insanity having been shown
to exist at the time of the commission of the offense
ul Supra, n. 98,

112 (remarks of Senator Hruska).
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is presumed to continue. * * * But I wonder if that
presumption really arises in all cases?
Certainly a presumption of continued insanity does
not logically arise from the establishment that at the
time of the commission of the offense the man was
temporarily insane or suffered from insanity of a
temporary type - that would not quite justify the
presumption....
I just wonder if there is not a middle ground here.
* ** I wonder if it would not be advisable to amend
the statute to provide that the trial judge, on the
basis of what he has learned during the trial, should
have the discretionary power either to make an inquiry at that time, after the verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity is made, . . . or at his election do
what this statute provides, commit a person tempo'
rarily . . . for a certain period of time."113
Although some testimony attacked the mandatory commitment procedure directly and there is some indication
from Senatorial comment that the lawmakers favored a
modification of the procedure, when the House passed a
bill 14 to revamp the District system it left intact the
mandatory commitment aspects but altered several collateral parts. The bill would have made insanity an
affirmative defense, read sociopathy out of mental illness
and altered the test of criminal responsibility, returning, it
was charged by the dissenters, to the "long discredited
M'Naghten" Rule." 5 The bill went to a Senate committee" and has not been heard of since.
This action of the House links tacit support to a
conclusion that can be drawn from the District of Columbia
experience. Contentions that individual freedom is being
unwarrantedly abridged arise from the interplay within
the total procedure regulating the insanity defense. While
the mandatory commitment procedure may, theoretically
at least," 7 send a sane man to a mental institution, this
I'Supra, n. 98, 573 (remarks of Senator Ervin). Emphasis added.
n4 H.R. 7052, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
103 Cong. Rec. 10369 (daily ed. June 26, 1961).
Id., 10535 (daily ed. June 27, 1961).
1-T
Hearings, supra, n. 52, 607 (remarks of Albe Krash) : "It is true that
it is theoretically possible for a sane man to be committed to a mental
institution at present in the District. The accused may have suffered from
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possible injustice is not caused only by the automatic
commitment.
If the District experience proves anything, it is that
in this largely unchartered (because of the little successful use of the insanity plea heretofore) area of the law,
things are not what they seem. The uproar in the District
after Durham grew out of a fear that insane criminals
would be set free; the recent uproar resulted from an allegation that sane men are being forced into a locked mental
hospital ward.
IV.
THE

ENGLISH PROCEDURE

Since we, as a nation, owe many of our liberties and
much of our legal procedure to our English heritage, it is
never inappropriate to look for guidance or comparison
to English methods when faced with a legal problem. In
regard to the insanity plea and commitment after successful pleading, the English offer a unique procedure, in some
ways more restrictive of individual freedom and, consequently, more responsive to society's demand for assured
safety. Yet, the English hardly can be charged with insensitivity to individual liberty.
Prior to the 14th Century, insanity was not a defense
to crime, but was ground for a special verdict, i.e., that
the accused committed the act when mad, which entitled
the prisoner to a pardon."" The patent rolls of Henry III
contain pardons of persons who had committed a homicide
while "mad."" 9 Furthermore, "lunatics" were apparently
not regarded as felons since a wife who, while insane, killed
her husband did not lose dower or other inheritance rights
as a sane murderer of a spouse would have. 2 ' From the
reign of Edward III (1327-1377) until 1883, insanity was an
absolute defense to crime:"'2 the insane person was not
punished as provided by law because furiosus furore
solum punitur (a madman is punished by his madness
alone) .22
a mental disease at the time of the offense, but, as a result of treatment
and
other factors, he may have recovered by the date of the verdict."
11 8
Barry, The Defence of In8anity, 10 Austl. L.J. 95 (1936).
1112 PoLLocK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, (1st ed. 1895) 478.
20

'

Supra, n.118.
3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORy OF ENGLISH LAW, (5th ed. 1942) 372.
BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Lewis' ed.

M4

1922) 24.
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An accused held not criminally responsible due to
insanity was subject to detention as a dangerous person
at the discretion of the trial judges who acquitted him.123
However, in 1800 Parliament eliminated the judiciary's
discretion and required the court to order anyone acquitted of a felony by reason 1of
insanity "to be detained
24
during His Majesty's pleasure.'
The attempted assassination of Queen Victoria by one
McLean led in 1883 to a change in the nature of the verdict
when insanity was raised as a defense. The gracious Queen
was unable to understand her advisors' explanation of
mens rea, or how a man she saw shoot at her could be
found "not guilty ....-112 Therefore, at her urging, the
jury was required thereafter to bring in, similar to the
original English procedure, a special verdict that defendant
was GUILTY of the act or omission charged BUT was
126
INSANE at the time the act was done or omission made.
However, the result of the verdict, i.e., that the defendant
be kept in custody, remained.
English procedure does not require any formal "plea"
of insanity. 127 In England the defendant alone can assert
the defense and initiate evidence of it, 2 s but Scotland
and South Africa allow the Crown to "lead evidence of
insanity.' 119 The burden of proof rests on the accused but
is no greater than that required of a party in a civil proceeding - establishing
insanity by "the preponderance of
13
' 0
probability.'
When a defendant is found guilty but insane, he is
detained in a "special hospital" or in a mental hospital
until discharged by the Crown.'
In practice, the Home
Secretary orders the discharge. To be discharged, the
medical authorities must believe "that the patient gives
abundant evidence of stability"'3 2 and the patient must
1" WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1961) 456.

" Criminal Lunatics Act, 1800. The provision subsequently was extended to misdemeanors. Wni.AMS, Zoo. oit. supra, n. 123.
10Supra, n. 118, 96; STRACHEY, QUEEN VICTORIA (London, 1921) p. 278.
"w10 Halsbury's Laws of England (3d ed. 1955) 289, Criminal Law,
Par. 534.
"' Supra, n. 123, 448.
12sRegina v. Dixon [1961] 1 W.L.R. 337. The prosecution cannot initiate
the evidence even though the defendant consents.
L" Supra, n. 123, 448.
"' Sodeman v. R. [1936] 2 All E. R., 1138; R. v. Carr-Brant [1943] K.B.
607, [1943] 2 All E.R. 156, 158.
'=10
Halsbury's Laws of England (3d ed. 1955) 289, Criminal Law,
Par. 534; supra, n. 123, p. 457. In practice most of the persons found
guilty but insane are sent to a special hospital, Broadmoor. Jackson, A
Note on Broadmoor Patients, 11 Camb. L.J. 57, 62 (1951).
Supra, n. 123, 458.
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have friends or relatives who will supervise his return to
normal life, and thus provide further assurance that there
will be no relapse.133 Apparently, it is not sufficient that
the patient's psychotic symptoms have remitted and there
are some sane people in a mental hospital because they
have no one who will accept the role of supervising their
return to society. 3 Furthermore, there is apparently some
tendency to retain one in the hospital for a term at least as
long as he would have served in prison when subsequent
mental observation
determines that defendant feigned
3
insanity.
The English automatic commitment procedure has been
attacked and two changes proposed: 136 (1) returning discretion to the court to release defendant at time of verdict
if "the judge sees no reason to fear a repetition of the
harm," and (2) taking the power to release away from a
Ministerial Official.
It will be noted that, while the automatic commitment
provision is similar to the District of Columbia, the release of a person found criminally insane is more restricted
than the District of Columbia plan. Protection of society is
given great weight in the English system. However, the
defendant alone can raise the issue of insanity in England'3 7 and the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution
only after more evidence has been admitted than in the
District. These two related considerations make less
likely any claims of railroading in England.
V.
THE MARYLAND FUTURE; SOME SUGGESTIONS

Maryland may shortly consider the alteration of its
test of criminal responsibility, and may, if it adopts a
broader test,138 be urged to also adopt a mandatory comSupra, n. 123, 458.
Supra, n. 123, 458, fn. 10.
Supra, n. 123, 458. A similar United States tendency is criticized in
Note, Releasing Criminal Defendants Acquitted and Committed Because
of Insanity: The Need for Balanced Administration, 68 Yale L.J. 293,

300 (1958).
Supra, n. 123, 460.

' But see supra n. 123, 450: "It

seems remarkable that a person who
cannot make a valid will or contract can effectively prevent evidence of
insanity being given at his trial."
18 The Maryland State Bar Association, at its 1962 Mid-Winter Meeting,
approved the report of the Special Cbmmittee on Insanity which had
recommended the following test of criminal responsibility:
"Where the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity shall be
pleaded in any criminal case in this State, the person making such
a defense shall not be responsible for criminal conduct if, as a result
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mitment procedure as a "necessary concomitant"'39 of the
new test. If that is proposed, 1 9a the Legislature should
validly ask (1) why the present Maryland procedure is
not adequate; (2) whether the altered procedure would
lead to a situation such as prevails in the District of
Columbia where cries of infringement of individual liberty
abound; and (3) if the evils of the District are avoided, is
mandatory commitment the optimum means of protecting
society and the individual?
The present Maryland procedure 40 allowing the jury to
determine both the defendant's sanity at the time of the
act and at the moment of the verdict allegedly has three
strikes against it. First, it is said not to prohibit expressly
a test of present sanity by the right and wrong yardstick.
Second, an intelligent answer to the question of present
insanity is allegedly impossible at the trial due to an
of mental disease or deficiency of intelligence at the time of such
conduct, he lacks sufficient capacity either to understand and appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirement of law."
This test differs from the Durham rule, 8upra, n. 46. For an excellent
and lengthy discussion of the Durham rule, the M'Naghten test and a
new formula, see United States v. Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961).
IOThomsen, Insanity as a Defense to Crime, 19 Md. L. Rev. 271, 291
(1959).
On September 5, 1962 the Judiciary Committee of the Maryland
Legislature made a favorable report to the Legislative Council of a proposal
of the Maryland State Bar Association that persons acquitted of a crime
because of insanity should be referred to the mental hospitals for a period
of observation.
The Bar Association proposal adopted at its annual meeting in Atlantic
City reads:
"A person who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, may,
within the discretion of the Court, be committed to one of the
appropriate mental institutions of the State of Maryland for examination and evaluation to determine whether or not by reason of mental
disease or defect he is a danger to himself, to his own safety or
will be a menace to ithe safety of the person and/or the property of
other people, with the right to such person to apply for release as
provided by law."
This proposal is apparently a modification of a recommendation made
by a Committee To Study The Laws For The Commitment of Mentally Ill
Persons. This Committee was chaired by Dr. Manfred S. Guttmacher and
was appointed by the Legislative Council of the Maryland Legislature.
The proposal read:
"If the verdict or finding of the jury be that the defendant was
insane at the time the offense was committed, the Court, unless it
shall appear to the Court that the defendant has fully recovered his
sanity, shall direct that the defendant be confined in the appropriate
State mental hospital until released as provided by law. If, however, it shall appear to the Court that the defendant has fully
recovered his sanity, such defendant shall be committed to the
appropriate State mental hospital for observation, until it shall
be determined by law that he has recovered his sanity and in no
event shall he be released until the expiration of a period of one
1 year from the date of the verdict or finding of the jury."
0 Supra, circa, ns. 14-18.
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absence of psychiatric observation. Third, the question of
insanity is beyond the comprehension of the jury.
Clearly, the test of insanity at the time of the verdict
should not be the right and wrong criterion. This point has
been argued from an analysis of the Maryland procedure
and cases recently and elaboration here would not add
light to that phase of the subject. It may be said, however,
that the right and wrong test is inappropriate logically
because the question after acquittal due to insanity is no
longer one of criminal responsibility. Rather, the propriety of the defendant's return to society after being
absolved of punishment for his act is to be determined."'
Dangerousness to self and others determines the re-entry
into society of one civilly insane; 142 logically, one who has
breached society's standards while insane should not be
returned on the basis of a different, and less restrictive,
test.'4 3
If insanity "now" would be determined on the basis of
dangerousness to self and others, do the other two alleged
defects in the current system still destroy its worth and
require a new procedure? Is a period of observation necessary after the verdict in order intelligently to determine
the person's sanity or dangerousness due to insanity? It
is to be noted that the trial judge may order a mental examination prior to trial. 4 4 Such an examination is not
required, but where it occurs, it would seem to provide the
information which medical authorities might impart to
the jury for determination of present sanity. Where such
an examination is conducted in a mental hospital over a
period of time, it would seem to have the same clinical
advantages as a commitment for observation after trial.
Where there has been no clinical examination prior to
trial, there would seem to be a genuine obstacle to a
credible determination of present mental status.
1 Cf., Salinger v. Superintendent, 206 Md. 623, 628-9, 112 A. 2d 907
(1955): "The confinement is not punishment, it is custodial. The acts
which preceded it merely served to bring about a judicial determination in
a particular form of the need for custodial confinement."
12Chasanow,
Civil and Criminal Commitment of the Mentally III in
Maryland, 21 Md. L. Rev. 279, 302 (1961).
14 Id., 297 :
"This test of insanity used In determining whether a person is
responsible for his otherwise criminal acts is probably the strictest of
all tests for insanity. A person could conceivably be insane under the
civil test (danger to self or others), be too insane to stand trial
(unable to conduct or assist in the conduct of his defense) and yet
be able to distinguish between right and wrong and kniw the nature
and consequences of his acts ..
'"5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 7.
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Regardless, to argue that the jury is not able to determine sanity at the time of the verdict, after it has judged
sanity at the time of the act seems incongruous.
If the present procedure recognized the dangerous-toself-and-others criterion and if there has been clinical
observation prior to the trial, the present procedure would
safeguard society while clearly protecting the individual
from commitment when really sane.
Yet, a period of observation after acquittal on insanity
grounds may be deemed wise policy and an additional
safeguard to society. If Maryland adopted the mandatory
commitment procedure, much of the criticism that attends
the District system might not develop since Maryland
appears to make insanity an affirmative defense with the
burden of proof on the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence his insanity. 14 5 The question of
who has the burden is important. When the burden is on
the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt
after some evidence of insanity is introduced, the argument arises that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is not a determination that defendant was ever
insane, but merely that there is a reasonable doubt as to
defendant's sanity. 146 Where defendant must prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence,' 4T such a claim
can not be made, for the jury actually must determine
defendant to have been insane.
A hedge is necessary when discussing the Maryland
rule in regard to burden of proof, because that is what the
Court of Appeals did in Thomas v. State. 4 There, the
Court refused to find error in a jury charge which stated:
"The burden is on the defendant to prove insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 1 49 But the weight of this statement is diminished
when the Court noted "there is no evidence here of any
mental disorder to shift the burden of proof to the
State." 50 Furthermore, the Court said it was not deciding
whether to follow the rule (accepted in the District) that
some evidence shifts the burden of proving sanity beyond
115Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 586-588, 112 A. 2d 913 (1955). Cf.,
Lipscomb v. State, 223 Md. 599, 604, 165 A. 2d 918 (1960).
1d Supra, circa, ns. 66-74.
, See State v. Barton, 361 Mo. 780, 236 S.W. 2d 596 (1951); Ortwein
v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414, 425 (1874) ; Holober v. Commonwealth, 191
Va. 826, 62 S.E. 2d 816 (1951); 'State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 Pac. 98
(1904).
1

206 Md. 575, 112 A. 2d 913 (1955).
Id., 587.
Supra, n. 148, 588. Emphasis ,added.
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a reasonable doubt to the state. Of this decision it has been
written:
"The Court of Appeals . . . apparently attempted
to avoid taking . . . a decisive stand, thus leaving
the question in a somewhat ambiguous state in Maryland. While it was obviously in favor of placing the
burden on the defendant, it was reluctant to openly
reject the position placing the burden upon the state.
* * * So uncertain is the Court's language in this part
of the opinion, that one cannot help wonder whether,
if the defendant had introduced enough evidence to
meet the requirements of the view placing the burden
on the state, the Court might not have adopted that
view.... 9)151
The Thomas case then is a slender reed on which to
base a distinction between Maryland and District of
Columbia procedure.
No Maryland case has been found deciding whether the
prosecution may initiate evidence of insanity. However,
Article 59, Section 7, which states the procedure for
presentation and determination of insanity in a criminal
case, reads:
"When it is desired to interpose the defense of
insanity . .. on behalf of one charged with a crime
...
the defendant, his or her counsel, or other person
authorized by law to appear and act for him or her,
shall . . . file a plea . . . alleging [insanity] ....
Whenever the plea of insanty ... shall be interposed
by or on behalf of any defendant * * ."152
This appears to prevent the prosecution or court from
raising the question of insanity as occurred in the District
in Lynch 53 and Tremblay.' "Other person authorized by
law" appears to refer to a guardian or trustee of the person's affairs. Moreover, by the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, 55 the phrase would be restricted to someone in a
legal relationship with the defendant.
Casenote, Burden of Proof of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L.
Rev. 157, 166-167 (1955).
Supra, n. 144. Emphasis added.
Supra, circa,ns. 93-97.
Supra, circa, ns. 88-89.
'1'"[W~here
general words follow an enumeration . . . such general
words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held
as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as
those specifically mentioned." Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
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If the burden of proof were on the defendant and if
only the defendant or his representative could initiate
evidence of insanity, Maryland would eliminate two talking
points used to discredit the District of Columbia procedure.
It is also to be noted that Maryland would not need
to manipulate its commitment provision to ensnare the
habitual criminal in a mental hospital. Maryland makes
particular provision for the disposition and care of the
"defective delinquent" through the Patuxent Institution.156
Thus, difference between the District and Maryland
must be recognized. But would mandatory commitment be
the optimum procedure in Maryland, or should some sort of
hearing be required before committal? In this regard,
Maryland is one of a small minority of states allowing
civil commitment through ex parte proceedings. This
means there is no trial of the insanity issue before commitment unless the patient appeals the commitment order.
Given this procedure applied to one who is not charged
with violation of law, would it not be anomalous to argue
that, commitment of one who has breached society standards by an act for which normal men are punished must be
preceded, to satisfy due process, by a hearing to determine
sanity at time of the special verdict? 5 7 Of course, the
ex parte procedure has never been tested by the Supreme
Court, but, until that tribunal declares its constitutional
status, it stands as the legislative policy which must be
considered.
Yet, it must not be overlooked that all of the arguments' 58 presented for avoiding the hearing in a civil
case - (1) traumatic effects of a judicial trial, where the
patient hears friends or relatives testifying as to why he
should be "put away"; (2) the delays and loss of time
involved in judicial proceedings; (3) the public record
of the commitment proceeding; and (4) the reluctance of
the patient and relatives to expose to a jury the "public
shame" of insanity - are worthless when there has been
a criminal trial. Where there has been a criminal trial
at which defendant was acquitted by reason of insanity,
there has been a trial, a public record has been established,
3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 31-B, § 1 et 8eq.
Our question presenting the anomaly includes an anomaly. It appears
that in Maryland once insanity is proved ,to have clouded the defendant's
mind at the time of the act there is no actual determination that the
defendant did commit the act. Supra, n. 18. However, "a plea bf 'not
guilty by reason of insanity' essentially is a plea whereby the accused
admits committing the act alleged .... " Supra, n. 151, 168.
us Supra, n. 142, 282.
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and defendant's friends have probably testified as to his
abnormal traits; there is no further delay beyond the trial
for at that time there must be a determination of what to
do with the defendant.
But for the presence of the ex parte procedure 1in
59
Maryland, we would follow Senator Ervin's suggestion
and allow the trial judge, after a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, either to (1) on the basis of the evidence
presented in the criminal case release the prisoner if he
would not be dangerous due to mental illness to self and
others, or (2) hear further testimony on mental status
"now" and, thereafter, release on the same basis as (1)
or commit for observation. This sort of procedure would
tend to avoid the theoretical possibility of a sane man being placed in a mental institution. It allows immediate
release of one no longer dangerous due to mental illness.
There is particular merit for such a procedure where there
has been clinical observation prior to trial. However, it
protects society by committing for an indefinite period
(until there has been a change in mental condition) those
still dangerous because of mental illness, and setting up
a procedure for observation in a doubtful case.
However, feeling it would be anomalous to grant
greater safeguards to one who has been found not guilty,
of an otherwise punishable act, by reason of insanity than
to one who has done nothing considered criminal, and
recognizing the legislative approval of the ex parte procedure for civil commitment, a mandatory commitment
procedure, for the purposes of observation and not as a
means of indefinite incarceration, would not be inconsistent
with Maryland legislative policy.
In regard to legislative policy, the procedure for placement of a person in a tuberculosis hospital' 6 is as illuminating as the above-mentioned civil commitment procedure. On report of a physician that a person has or is
suspected of having tuberculosis in a communicable stage
and is conducting himself in public so as to expose others to
infection, or if a state health officer has such knowledge,
the medical officer may cause an examination to determine
if the person has tuberculosis in communicable stage. If
the tests are positive, a state medical officer may order the
person removed to a tuberculosis hospital for treatment.
Danger to self and others is the rationale for hospitalization, but the examination is made before transfer into
20

Supra, n. 113.

10 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 43, § 98.
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custody. Unlike a chest x-ray or other test for tuberculosis,
an examination for mental illness requires, in the opinion
of most observers, an extended period of time. Reasoning
that an examination is necessary to safeguard society both
where the patient may be insane or tubercular, the examination should be valid and extend as long as necessary
to thoroughly examine.
In order to keep mandatory commitment merely a procedure for observation and examination, we would allow
as long as 90 days for the testing. Thereafter, the patient
may be subject to civil commitment, with no hearing necessary unless the patient appeals. Finally, any appeal should
be handled in the same manner as an appeal from an
ex parte civil commitment.

